Maryland Journal of International Law
Volume 25 | Issue 1

International Law in Perplexing Times
Jeffrey L. Dunoff

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil
Part of the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Jeffrey L. Dunoff, International Law in Perplexing Times, 25 Md. J. Int'l L. 11 (2010).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol25/iss1/4

This Conference is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maryland
Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

Article 4

DUNOFF (DO NOT DELETE)

5/27/2010 2:49 PM

International Law in Perplexing Times
JEFFREY L. DUNOFF†
_______________________

It is a great honor to have been invited to present the keynote
address at this conference. In her remarks, former Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright provided us with an insightful overview of the
role of international law in international relations. Drawing from her
rich experiences, she detailed both the potential and the limits of
international norms and institutions in a complex and rapidly
changing world. I will try to complement Secretary Albright‘s
thoughtful observations by approaching similar themes from the
relatively detached perspective of an international law scholar.1
Our conference title directs us to explore evolving conceptions of
international law and governance. I take this as an invitation to
engage in the wonderfully creative task of imagining the future of the
global legal order. It would be difficult to identify a topic that is more
† Professor of Law and Director, Institute for International Law & Public
Policy, Temple University Beasley School of Law. This paper is a slightly
expanded version of a keynote presentation delivered at a Symposium on
Multilateralism and Global Law: Evolving Conceptions of International Law and
Governance at the University of Maryland School of Law on October 23, 2009 and
retains the informal nature of my oral remarks. I am grateful to Professors Michael
Van Alstine and Peter Danchin and the editors of the Maryland Journal of
International Law for inviting me to speak at the Symposium and for their
outstanding hospitality at the event itself. I am also grateful to Duncan Hollis,
Laura Little, and conference participants for useful feedback on earlier versions of
this paper.
1. For reflections on the potential tensions between viewing international law
from a practitioner‘s perspective and doing so from an academic perspective, see
generally Jeffrey L. Dunoff, International Legal Scholarship at the Millennium, 1
CHI. J. INT‘L L. 85 (2000).
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important, more timely, or more challenging. Mindful of Yogi
Berra‘s observation that ―it‘s tough to make predictions, especially
about the future,‖ how can we realistically—but imaginatively—
predict international law‘s future?
I wonder if we might start by reflecting on the organization of this
important event. The conference title directs our attention to the ways
that international law and global governance will likely evolve.
However, the lens through which the conference asks us to imagine
international law‘s future is quite unusual. Strikingly, the conference
panels did not address classic and enduring issues such as the use of
force and self-defense or core public international law issues like
human rights or sovereignty. No panels were devoted to emerging
issue areas such as international criminal law or public health.
Perhaps most surprisingly, none addressed highly salient issues such
as terrorism or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Instead, the conference panels were organized around international
environmental issues and international economics. Panelists
addressed specific international regimes within these broad fields: the
trade regime, the climate regime, the chemicals regime. In
foregrounding these specific topics, the conference presents us with a
vision of an international legal order structured around discrete
regulatory regimes.
The intriguing question presented is how the conference title
relates to the conference panels. The relationship is not obvious,
because our large topic of inquiry—the evolution of the international
order—looks to the future, while the structure of the panels—
organized along the lines of functionally separate regimes—reflects
international law‘s recent past. Thus embedded into the very structure
and organization of the conference is a tension between looking back
and looking ahead. It is precisely this Janus-faced duality,
simultaneously engaging international law‘s past and future, that I
wish to explore. Specifically, can we discern international law‘s
future using the conceptual apparatus and vocabulary of international
law‘s past?
This is an extremely large inquiry, and I cannot possibly do it
justice in this short paper. Hence my more modest goal is to outline
some analytical frameworks for conceptualizing international law‘s
future trajectory. To do so, this paper will address three related
topics. First, it will briefly describe the conventional understanding of

DUNOFF (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

5/27/2010 2:49 PM

INTERNATIONAL LAW IN PERPLEXING TIMES

13

international law as a field organized along functional lines. Next, the
paper will discuss how certain recent developments, which I will
label as ―regime interactions,‖ are rendering the standard account
increasingly obsolete. Finally, the paper will outline three conceptual
approaches to the field‘s future, each of which seeks to address the
discipline‘s current challenges, but in quite different ways. The
ultimate question we face—as scholars, practitioners, and global
citizens—is which of these three approaches is both politically
realizable and normatively desirable.
I
Let us start by considering why international law is organized
along functional regimes. This question points us backwards and
invites a very quick foray through international law‘s recent history. 2
A necessarily truncated version of a rather more complex story would
run as follows.
A century ago, international law‘s domain was relatively limited.
The field lacked a robust institutional infrastructure; there were few
international organizations and no permanent international courts.
The international legal order, such as it was, largely permitted states
to do that which they were not expressly prohibited from doing, and
restrictions on sovereign rights were not easily presumed. This order
permitted a potentially Hobbesian state of nature controlled by a
limited number of basic ground rules rooted in the equal sovereignty
2. See generally ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF
NATIONS (rev. ed. 1954); J.H.W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE: VOLUME I: GENERAL SUBJECTS (1968); J.H.W. VERZIJL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: PART II: INTERNATIONAL
PERSONS (1969); J.H.W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE: PART III: STATE TERRITORY (1970); J.H.W. VERZIJL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: PART IV: STATELESS DOMAIN
(1971); J.H.W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: PART
V: NATIONALITY AND OTHER MATTERS RELATING TO INDIVIDUALS (1972); J.H.W.
VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: PART VI: JURIDICAL
FACTS AS SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS (1973); J.H.W.
VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: PART VII: STATE
SUCCESSION (1974); J.H.W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE: PART VIII: INTER-STATE DISPUTES AND THEIR SETTLEMENT (1976);
J.H.W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: PART IX-A:
THE LAWS OF WAR (1978); J.H.W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE: PART IX-B: THE LAW OF NEUTRALITY (1979); J.H.W. VERZIJL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: PART IX-C: THE LAW OF
MARITIME PRIZE (1992); WALTER SCHIFFER, THE LEGAL COMMUNITY OF
MANKIND (1954).
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of all states.
The minimalist legal order and sparse institutional landscape began
to change in the aftermath of World War I. The war‘s immense
carnage—including a military death toll of between nine and ten
million—was understood as a powerful indictment of pre-war
political and social structures, and there was a widespread sense that
the pre-war diplomatic and legal system needed substantial reform.
Diplomats turned to international law to accomplish this task. Indeed,
―there has never been more talk about international law and
organization than in the years immediately following World War I.‖3
Woodrow Wilson and other elites believed that the pre-war
―balance of power‖ system was inherently unstable and incapable of
securing lasting peace.4 Moreover, the war‘s fearsome violence—
including the widespread use of tanks, flame throwers, poison gas,
submarines, airplanes, and other powerful weapons—convinced
states that unlimited recourse to war was no longer acceptable and
that armed conflict should be regulated through legal arrangements.
Hence leading states negotiated the League of Nations, premised
upon the idea of collective security, as a way of ensuring that future
international disputes did not escalate into threats to international
peace and security. Less than a decade later, states entered into the
Pact of Paris, condemning recourse to war and agreeing to the pacific
solution of international controversies.5
International law also addressed various other forms of
international cooperation, often in contexts of interdependence. States
entered into important treaties in areas such as communications,
airspace, navigation, labor, and railways. The era also marked the
3. Martti Koskenniemi, History of International Law, World War I to World
War II, in MAX PLANCK & RUDOLF BERNHARDT, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW.
4. Wilson‘s famous ―Peace Without Victory‖ speech claimed that a new
European balance of power could not produce a ―stable equilibrium.‖ Woodrow
Wilson, Address of the President of the United States of America: A League for
Peace, S. DOC. NO. 64-685, at 5 (1917). In pressing for the Versailles Treaty,
Wilson argued that the balance of power system had caused the Great War.
Woodrow Wilson, Treaty of Peace with Germany, S. DOC. NO. 66-50 (1919). For
more on the history of balance of power approaches to international relations, see
generally Alfred Vagts & Detlev F. Vagts, The Balance of Power in International
Law: A History of an Idea, 73 AM. J. INT‘L L. 555 (1979).
5. General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy
art. II, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
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start of the institutionalization of international law,6 including the
creation of specialized bodies such as the International Labour
Organization and the establishment of the Permanent Court of
International Justice. Finally, international law began to address
issues like self-determination and minority rights, albeit in
circumscribed ways.7
Of course, these efforts were hardly unqualified successes. The
League was hampered by its lack of universality, including the
United States‘ failure to join and its inability to achieve independence
from the policies of its most powerful European members. Shortly
thereafter, the failure to respond meaningfully to Japan‘s invasion of
Manchuria and Italy‘s invasion of Abyssinia signaled the demise of
the League‘s collective security system. The cataclysm that
followed—including some fifty million dead, Germany‘s efforts to
destroy European Jewry and other groups, and the use of nuclear
weapons—marked the end of the inter-war system.
Perhaps surprisingly, the aftermath of World War II saw an
intensification of many of the doctrinal and institutional trends that
began during the inter-war years. In the United Nations (UN) Charter,
states agreed to ban the use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of states, with limited exceptions, including
when a state is responding in self-defense to an armed attack and
when the use of force is authorized by the UN itself. Hence the
League of Nations‘ failures prompted states to modify, rather than
reject, the project to build an international collective security system.
States similarly revisited the issues of human rights and selfdetermination. In 1948, the UN General Assembly proclaimed the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which sparked the creation
of a large corpus of human rights law. In addition, the World War II
victors organized trials of German and Japanese political and military
leaders, solidifying the notion that international law imposes duties
directly upon individuals. The decades following the war also saw the
independence of many former colonial possessions and formal
6. For a comprehensive discussion, see generally David Kennedy, The Move to
Institutions, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 841 (1987).
7. See PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF
MINORITIES 47 (1991). See also generally THOMAS D. MUSGRAVE, SELFDETERMINATION AND NATIONAL MINORITIES (1997); THE PROTECTION OF
MINORITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1992).
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recognition that decolonization had become a ―principle of
international law.‖8
The institutionalization of the international order that began in
significant part with the League of Nations accelerated in the postwar era. In addition to the United Nations, states created numerous
specialized bodies such as the International Monetary Fund, the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World
Bank), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to address
international economic issues. Other specialized international bodies
were formed to address aviation (the International Civil Aviation
Organization), intellectual property (the World Intellectual Property
Organization), and public health (the World Health Organization). In
addition, a series of important regional bodies were established,
including the European Community, the Organization of American
States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations.
These separate bodies and institutions reflected deliberate efforts
by groups of states to respond to new and emerging political,
economic, and social developments. For current purposes, it is
significant that the various regimes and institutions developed in a
relatively ad hoc and uncoordinated fashion. Within the academic
discipline, each specific substantive field, such as trade or human
rights or environment, was understood to be a part of public
international law. But each was typically taught and learned as if it
were an independent and autonomous field. The implicit message
was that the whole consists of a collection of fragmentary parts and
that these different parts seldom, if ever, connect.
Many of these post-war trends have accelerated in the last two
decades. International institutions and norms have continued to
proliferate, and today virtually every sphere of social life is subject to
some type of international regulation.9 Recent institutional
8. See, e.g., Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), at 66–67, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., 947th plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514 (XV) (Dec. 14, 1960).
9. LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 17–28 (Judith L. Goldstein et al. eds.,
2001). To be sure, the legalization of international relations has not been even
across all areas of international affairs, see generally Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The
Concept of Legalization, 54 INT‘L ORG. 401 (2000), and even within specific areas
it can wax and wane over time, see, e.g., Beth A. Simmons, The Legalization of
International Monetary Affairs, 54 INT‘L ORG. 573 (2000).
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developments include the Group of 20 Finance Ministers and Central
Bank Governors (G-20) that first met in 1999, the Leaders-20 (L-20)
formed in 2003, and the UN Peacebuilding Commission established
in 2005.
As the density of norms and institutions has increased, so has their
reach. International rules have become more demanding and intrusive
and now reach far inside the domestic domain. The growing density
of international bodies has been accompanied by dramatic shifts in
power and authority to the international plane. At the same time, as
Professors Percival and Osofsky emphasized in their conference
contributions, international law-making processes have grown more
diffuse. Today, a growing array of domestic agencies, transnational
organizations, and experts engage in decision making and
implementation.10
These various developments have given rise to important doctrinal,
conceptual, and normative challenges. In democratic societies,
sovereignty resides in ―we the people.‖ To the extent polities
understand themselves to be self-governing, legal rules from outside
can seem problematic.11 Critics perceive an erosion of sovereignty
when power is delegated to international bodies12 and question the
legitimacy of international law.13 Others argue that international
10. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, Multiscalar Governance and Climate Change:
Reflections on the Role of States and Cities at Copenhagen, 25 MD J. INT‘L L. 64
(2010); Robert V. Percival, Liability for Environmental Harm and Emerging
Global Environmental Law, 25 MD. J. INT‘L L. 37 (2010). See also ANNE-MARIE
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of
International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of
International Law, 43 VA. J. INT‘L L. 1 (2002); David Zaring, Three Challenges for
Regulatory Networks, 43 INT‘L LAW. 211 (2009).
11. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, Medellín and the Future of International
Delegation, 118 YALE L.J. 1712 (2009). Notably, an important strand of
scholarship argues, to the contrary, that international law can enhance democracy
on the domestic plane. See Robert O. Keohane et al., Democracy-Enhancing
Multilateralism, 63 INT‘L ORG. 1 (2008).
12. For example, Julian Ku claims that UN member states ―have given up one
of the most precious rights of absolute sovereignty, the right to use military force
against another state.‖ Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to
International Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV.
71, 84 n.38 (2000) (citing U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4).
13. See JEREMY A. RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT NATIONS? WHY CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES 244–48 (2005). See also generally
Samantha Besson, The Authority of International Law: Lifting the State Veil, 31
SYDNEY L. REV. 343 (2009); Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The
Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions, 20 ETHICS & INT‘L AFF. 405 (2006);
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bodies are ―bureaucratic, diplomatic, technocratic – everything but
democratic.‖14 Troubled by rules and rulings from afar, some critics
claim that international law suffers from a democracy deficit.15
II
As if the changes to the international legal order and the attendant
critiques reviewed above were insufficiently challenging,
developments in the last several years have made standard functional
approaches to organizing the field appear increasingly obsolete. The
heightened interdependence associated with globalization has
increasingly given rise to fact patterns that cross regimes and that
involve what we might call regime interaction. Consider, for
example, the international transfer of hazardous materials from one
state to another. A single transboundary shipment involves
international environmental law, the law of the sea, international
trade law, the law of maritime transit, and probably international
labor law, human rights, and other fields as well.16 Each of these
LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Volker Röben eds.,
2008); THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Jean-Marc Coicaud
& Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001); John Tasioulas, The Legitimacy of International
Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Samantha Besson & John
Tasioulas eds., 2009). For important defenses of international law‘s legitimacy, see
generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS
(1990); Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power:
International Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium, 100 AM. J. INT‘L L. 88
(2006).
14. Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1971, 2018 (2004).
15. For various perspectives on this debate, see, e.g., Gráinne de Búrca,
Developing Democracy Beyond the State, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 221
(2008); Robert A. Dahl, Can International Organizations Be Democratic? A
Skeptic’s View, in DEMOCRACY‘S EDGES 19–36 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano HackerCordón eds., 1999); Andrew Moravcsik, Is There a ‘Democratic Deficit’ in World
Politics? A Framework for Analysis, 39 GOV‘T & OPP. 336 (2004); Joseph S. Nye,
Jr., Globalization’s Democratic Deficit: How to Make International Institutions
More Accountable, 80 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2 (2001); Eric Stein, International
Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 AM. J. INT‘L L. 489, 534
(2001). Much of the literature has focused on the WTO. See, e.g., James Bacchus,
A Few Thoughts on Legitimacy, Democracy, and the WTO, 7 J. INT‘L ECON. L. 667
(2004); B.S. Chimni, The World Trade Organization, Democracy and
Development: A View From the South, 40 J. WORLD TRADE 5 (2006).
16. I borrow the example from the ILC report on fragmentation. See Int‘l Law
Comm‘n, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission,
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification
and Expansion of International Law, paras. 21–26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr.
13, 2006) (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi).
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regimes has its own rules, practices, and institutions. The rules of any
one regime are typically developed in relative isolation and ignorance
of the rules of other regimes. Fact patterns that involve regime
overlap raise the very real possibility of regime collision and regime
conflict. Although international law‘s fragmented order is not new,
recent developments have highlighted this feature of the field and
given rise to serious difficulties in law creation, application,
interpretation, and enforcement.
Today, regime overlap and interaction is ubiquitous;17
contemporary international law is marked by the following sorts of
doctrinal and conceptual puzzles. First, as international courts and
tribunals proliferate, what should happen when a court in one regime
is asked to apply a rule from another regime? Should a World Trade
Organization (WTO) panel, for example, invoke non-WTO law, such
as the Biodiversity Convention or the Cartegena Protocol, in a
dispute over European bans on genetically modified organisms?18
Second, what should happen when the same fact pattern is the subject
of simultaneous proceedings before multiple international tribunals?
Consider the Swordfish dispute.19 In an effort to discourage certain
fishing practices, Chile banned access to its ports to Spanish vessels.
The European Community (EC) claimed that these acts violated
17. For a detailed description and typology, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Rethinking
Regime Interaction (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
18. See Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting the
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R (Sept. 29, 2006). For
the definitive study of this dispute, see generally MARK A. POLLACK & GREGORY
C. SHAFFER, WHEN COOPERATION FAILS: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS (2009). Whether WTO panels should use nonWTO law has sparked a large and at times contentious literature. See, e.g., Philip
Alston, Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A
Reply to Petersmann, 13 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 815 (2002); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The WTO
in Transition: Of Constituents, Competence and Coherence, 33 GEO. WASH. INT‘L
L. REV. 979 (2001); Robert Howse, Human Rights in the WTO: Whose Rights,
What Humanity? Comment on Petersmann, 13 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 651 (2002); David
Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law, 92 AM.
J. INT‘L L. 398 (1998); JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for a United Nations
‘Global Compact’ for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide
Organizations: Lessons from European Integration, 13 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 621 (2002);
Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT‘L L.J.
333 (1999).
19. See generally Marcos A. Orellana, The Swordfish Dispute Between the EU
and Chile at ITLOS and the WTO, 71 NORDIC J. INT‘L L. 55 (2002).
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international trade norms and initiated dispute resolution proceedings
at the WTO. At the same time, Chile argued that Spanish fishing
practices violated the Law of the Sea and initiated proceedings before
a chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. 20 How
should tribunals housed in different legal regimes relate to each
other?21 How should the international legal system deal with parallel
or sequential litigation?22 Third, what should happen when the same
legal issue comes before tribunals in different regimes and these
tribunals produce different interpretations? One high profile example
occurred when the World Court and the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) produced different
interpretations of the foundational international law doctrine on the
appropriate legal standard for imputing the actions of an individual,
or group of individuals, to a state.23
20. Although this dispute quickly settled, other times parallel litigation
proceeds. Consider the MOX Plant Case, involving litigation over UK efforts to
build a nuclear reprocessing plant. This case gave rise to litigation before two
different tribunals under the Law of the Sea Convention, litigation at the European
Court of Justice under EU law, and litigation before an arbitral tribunal formed
under a regional environmental treaty, the Convention for the Protection of the
North-East Atlantic.
21. The proliferation of international courts and tribunals has given rise to a
substantial literature. For a sampling of the scholarship, see Georges Abi-Saab,
Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. &
POL. 919 (1999); Thomas Buergenthal, Proliferation of International Courts and
Tribunals: Is It Good or Bad?, 14 LEIDEN J. INT‘L L. 267 (2001); Jonathan I.
Charney, Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?,
217 RECUEIL DES COURS 101 (1998); Benedict Kingsbury, Foreword: Is the
Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals a Systemic Problem?, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 679 (1999); Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of
International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. &
POL. 709 (1999). This literature focuses on horizontal relationships among
international tribunals and should be distinguished from scholarship that addresses
the vertical relations between international and domestic courts. For an example of
this latter scholarship, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Less Than Zero: The Effects of Giving
Domestic Effect to WTO Law, 6 LOY. U. CHI. INT‘L L. REV. 279 (2008).
22. Current examples include litigation arising out of the Georgia–Russia
conflict over Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia, which are currently pending before
both the World Court and European Court of Human Rights, and the dozens of
investment arbitrations arising out of Argentina‘s efforts to address an economic
emergency in 2001.
23. See, e.g., Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 91 (Feb.
26); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, App. Ch. (July 15, 1999);
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). For scholarly reactions, see, e.g., Antonio Cassese,
The Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgement on
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The highly fragmented nature of the international legal system
permits, and perhaps invites, regime collisions and conflicts. To be
sure, rule conflicts exist in every legal order. But most domestic legal
orders have relatively well-developed rules for dealing with conflict.
These rules set out hierarchical relations among different courts and
often among different bodies of law. International law, in contrast,
remains fundamentally a horizontal order,24 and few, if any, rules
address the relationships between different regimes or different
courts. The doctrinal lacuna and conceptual confusion in this area
have led some to conclude that we inhabit a ―global disorder of
normative orders.‖25 In short, if international law‘s past is marked by
the rise of specialized functional regimes—as the organization of the
conference panels suggests—then a key challenge of the field‘s
present is making sense of regime interaction.26
III
Hence contemporary challenges to international law and global
governance are indeed formidable. If we take traditional concerns
over international law‘s lack of enforcement, add modern critiques of
international law being insufficiently democratic or legitimate, and
then add the challenges posed by regime interaction, we might say
that the discipline now faces its own version of the four horsemen of
the apocalypse. For international lawyers, these are indeed perplexing
times.
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that many question
whether familiar conceptual and analytic tools are up to the task of
explaining and managing current challenges.27 Nor is it surprising that
Genocide in Bosnia, 18 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 649 (2007); Richard J. Goldstone &
Rebecca J. Hamilton, Bosnia v. Serbia: Lessons from the Encounter of the
International Court of Justice with the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 21 LEIDEN J. INT‘L L. 95 (2008).
24. See generally J.H.H. Weiler & Andreas L. Paulus, The Structure of Change
in International Law or Is There a Hierarchy of Norms in International Law?, 8
EUR. J. INT‘L L. 545 (1997).
25. Neil Walker, Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the
Global Disorder of Normative Orders, 6 INT‘L J. CONST. L. 373, 373 (2008).
26. For one thoughtful attempt, see generally REGIME INTERACTION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: FACING FRAGMENTATION (Margaret Young ed., forthcoming
2010).
27. The sense of deep unease and the accompanying calls for rethinking the
field are not limited to academics. See, e.g., The Rule of Law at the National and
International Levels, G.A. Res. 63/128, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/128 (Dec. 11, 2008).
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so many in the fields of international law, political science,
sociology, and cognate disciplines are attempting to rethink our
capacity for effective and sustainable global governance. Do
emerging approaches to international law offer promising ways to
productively address the field‘s current perplexities?
Although efforts to develop analytical and normative tools to
address international law‘s current challenges are in their early
stages, I think we can already identify at least three different
conceptual approaches to the field that are on offer: (1) international
constitutionalism, (2) global administrative law, and (3) global legal
pluralism.28 Each of these approaches has different goals and comes
in many variants, so at the risk of oversimplification, let me briefly
describe each.
A. International Constitutionalism
International constitutionalists urge the application of
constitutional principles to improve the effectiveness and fairness of
the international legal order.29 Constitutionalist approaches vary
widely in the scope of their ambitions; the most far-reaching of the
constitutionalist visions attempt to set out a fully justified global
order.30 However, even in its more modest guises, the constitutionalist
28. I do not mean to suggest that these three approaches exhaust innovative
approaches to rethinking the field. Indeed, Jutta Brunnée, one of the contributors to
this volume, see Jutta Brunnée, From Bali to Copenhagen: Towards a Shared
Vision for a Post-2012 Climate Regime?, 25 MD. J. INT‘L L. 86 (2010), has
developed an alternative understanding of international law. JUTTA BRUNNÉE &
STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN
INTERACTIONAL ACCOUNT (forthcoming 2010) (combining Lon Fuller‘s legal
theory with constructivist insights to generate a theory of how international legal
norms are created). However, the three approaches discussed above represent three
of the most prominent of the emerging schools of thought.
29. See generally Anne Peters, The Merits of Global Constitutionalism, 16 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 397 (2009). Although it is not always clear whether the
constitutionalism literature purports to be descriptive or aspirational, much of this
literature argues that the international order is already significantly
constitutionalized. See, e.g., Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as
Constitution of the International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 529
(1998); André Nollkaemper, Constitutionalization and the Unity of the Law of
International Responsibility, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 535 (2009)
(analyzing the ―constitutional elements‖ of the law of international responsibility);
Christian Tomuschat, International Law as the Constitution of Mankind, in UNITED
NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE EVE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
VIEWS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 37–50 (1997).
30. See, e.g., Erika de Wet, The International Constitutional Order, 55 INT‘L &
COMP. L.Q. 51 (2006).
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turn can be understood as an effort to give the largely unstructured
and historically accidental order of global governance a rational,
justifiable shape.
The notion of an international constitution may strike many as odd,
perhaps even fantastic. Constitutions are historically rooted in
domestic political settings. So the very concept of an international
constitution might appear to be a category error. Even those who
believe that international constitutions could exist in principle might
reasonably ask whether they exist in practice. Finally, discourse
about international constitutions might prompt skepticism because
constitutions are powerful and foundational legal instruments, and
international law is said to be marked by weakness and
ineffectiveness.31 So to even invoke this term begs a series of
challenging empirical, conceptual, and normative questions: as an
analytic matter, what is an international constitution? As a descriptive
matter, are international regimes constitutionalized? And, as a
normative matter, is international constitutionalization desirable?
Within the rapidly expanding literature on international
constitutionalism, all of these questions are highly contested.32 My
contribution to these debates is found in a recent book entitled Ruling
the World? Constitutionalism, International Law and Global
Governance. In this volume, Joel Trachtman and I detail an approach
to international constitutionalism that highlights international rules
that enable or constrain the creation of international law. 33 Hence our
31. For an intriguing critique of this conventional divide between international
and constitutional law, see generally Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for
States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV.
1792 (2009).
32. For a sampling of the literature, see, e.g., de Wet, supra note 30; Bardo
Fassbender, The Meaning of International Constitutional Law, in TRANSNATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM: INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 307–28
(Nicholas Tsagourias ed., 2007); JAN KLABBERS ET AL., THE
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009); TOWARDS WORLD
CONSTITUTIONALISM: ISSUES IN THE LEGAL ORDERING OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY
(Ronald St. John MacDonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 2005); Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, Justice in International Economic Law? From the ‘International Law
Among States’ to ‘International Integration Law’ and ‘Constitutional Law‘, 6
GLOBAL CMTY. Y.B. INT‘L L. & JURISPRUDENCE 105 (2006); Christian Walter,
Constitutionalizing (Inter)national Governance – Possibilities for and Limits to the
Development of an International Constitutional Law, 44 GERMAN Y.B. INT‘L L.
170 (2001).
33. Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, A Functional Approach to
International Constitutionalization, in RULING THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM,
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focus is on ―rules about rules,‖ or what H.L.A. Hart called secondary
rules.34 Our functionalist approach joins other constitutionalist
approaches, ranging from those that emphasize human rights and
judicial review in international institutions,35 to broader calls for a
legalization of transnational politics,36 to visions of a global order
governed by an identifiable constitutional text.37
B. Global Administrative Law
An alternative approach to understanding the emerging global legal
order is offered by ―global administrative law‖ (GAL) scholars.38 The
key insight in this literature is that much modern global governance
can be understood as regulation and administration. This activity
occurs not in high-profile diplomatic conferences or treaty
negotiations but in less visible settings that GAL scholars identify as
a ―global administrative space.‖ GAL describes these little-known
international, transnational, and domestic processes and urges that
they be reformed along lines that advance administrative law values,
such as transparency, consultation, participation, reasoned decision
making, and review processes.
INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 3–36 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel
P. Trachtman eds., 2009).
34. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
35. See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, De-Fragmentation of International
Economic Law Through Constitutional Interpretation and Adjudication with Due
Respect for Reasonable Disagreement, 6 LOY. U. CHI. INT‘L L. REV. 209 (2008);
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Judging Judges: From ‘Principal-Agent Theory’ to
‘Constitutional Justice’ in Multilevel ‘Judicial Governance’ of Economic
Cooperation Among Citizens, 11 J. INT‘L ECON. L. 827 (2008); Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, Time for a United Nations ‘Global Compact’ for Integrating Human
Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European
Integration, 13 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 621 (2002).
36. See generally Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A
Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis, 15 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 907 (2004).
37. See generally Bardo Fassbender, Rediscovering a Forgotten Constitution:
Notes on the Place of the UN Charter in the International Legal Order, in RULING
THE WORLD, supra note 33, at 133–48.
38. See Benedict Kingsbury et al., Foreword: Global Governance as
Administration – National and Transnational Approaches to Global Administrative
Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 5 (2005) (discussing the early studies of the
Global Administrative Law Research Project at New York University). See also
generally Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale:
Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490 (2006); Eleanor D. Kinney,
The Emerging Field of International Administrative Law: Its Content and
Potential, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 415 (2002); Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury,
Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the
International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 1 (2006).
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GAL offers an intriguing challenge to conventional ways of
understanding international legal processes. Conventional
understandings rely on certain fundamental dichotomies—such as the
distinctions between international and domestic law and between
public and private governance—that GAL problematizes. GAL
scholars highlight the ways that different types of actors and different
layers of governance together ―form a variegated ‗global
administrative space‘ that includes international institutions and
transnational networks as well as domestic administrative bodies that
operate within international regimes or cause transboundary
regulatory effects‖ and that transcend the traditional distinctions
between public and private and national and international.39 Through
their richly textured analysis of many little-known international legal
processes and their impressive conceptualization of a diverse set of
practices across a wide range of otherwise disparate areas of global
governance, GAL scholars have already made important
contributions to our understanding of current governance regimes.
C. Global Legal Pluralism
A third emerging conceptual approach to international law is
global legal pluralism. This approach is the intellectual heir to earlier
sociological and anthropological examinations of the legal pluralism
that resulted from the interactions between official and nonofficial
law, often in colonial settings.40 Hence this earlier literature typically
addressed the plurality or multiplicity of legal norms or regimes
applicable within a single domestic legal order, a situation Samantha
Besson has usefully labeled ―internal legal pluralism.‖41 In its more
recent international law iterations, legal pluralism has taken on
several connotations.42 For current purposes, I use the term to
39. Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law,
20 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 23, 25 (2009).
40. See generally John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL
PLURALISM 1 (1986); Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC‘Y REV.
869 (1988). Of course, the insight that more than one body of law may be
applicable to a fact pattern predates these writings. See Karl N. Llewellyn, A
Realistic Jurisprudence – The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 455–56 (1930)
(―What – more than one law . . . in a single jurisdiction, according to the whim or
practice of an official, or according to the funds or temperament or political
complexion of the layman affected? Just that.‖).
41. Samantha Besson, European Legal Pluralism after Kadi, 5 EUR. CONST. L.
REV. 237, 258 (2009).
42. For a sampling of pluralist approaches to diverse international legal issues,
see Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2007).
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highlight the simultaneous existence of numerous semi-autonomous
global and regional functional legal orders.43 Thus in the global
context, pluralism is an approach that recognizes the coexistence of
multiple official systems of law, all with their own Grundnormen or
rules of recognition.44
To the extent that conventional approaches understand law as a
unified and hierarchically ordered system of rules, at first glance
pluralism might seem to be the antithesis of law. However it is more
fruitful to understand pluralism as offering a rather different vision of
law. Particularly to lawyers in the United States, pluralist thinking
should not seem foreign or exotic. After all, the United States is a
polity that has fifty sovereign law makers in addition to the federal
government and enduring issues over the allocation of power among
these authorities. Moreover, the United States‘ legal system is
marked by what one might call ―interpretative pluralism,‖ as
authority to interpret the U.S. Constitution is ultimately undefined,
and the various branches continuously compete over interpretative
authority.45 In the international sphere, pluralism recognizes the
emergence of numerous sites and sources of transnational governance
and suggests a highly decentralized approach to the management of
legal diversity. As a visual matter, pluralist approaches to law suggest
the image of a web instead of the more familiar pyramid of law; in a
pluralist world, dialogue and accommodation replace authoritative
determination as the modus vivendi.46
Is one of these approaches superior to the others?47 In a paper of
See also generally Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV.
863 (2006); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Transnational Spaces: Norms and
Legitimacy, 33 YALE J. INT‘L L. 479 (2008); Paul Schiff Berman, A Pluralist
Approach to International Law, 32 YALE J. INT‘L L. 301 (2007). For an overview
of different approaches to pluralism, see generally Ralf Michaels, Global Legal
Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 243 (2009).
43. For writings in this vein, see generally GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE
(Gunther Teubner ed., 1997); Paul Schiff Berman, The New Legal Pluralism, 5
ANN. REV. LAW & SOC. SCI. 225 (2009).
44. Neil MacCormick‘s work has been particularly influential in this regard.
See, e.g., Neil MacCormick, Beyond the Sovereign State, 56 MOD. L. REV. 1
(1993); Neil MacCormick, Risking Constitutional Collision in Europe?, 18 OX. J.
LEGAL STUD. 517 (1998).
45. Daniel Halberstam, Constitutional Heterarchy: The Centrality of Conflict in
the European Union and the United States, in RULING THE WORLD?, supra note 33,
at 333.
46. See generally Aleinikoff, supra note 42.
47. This way of framing the question is potentially misleading, insofar as there
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this length, it is not possible to resolve this highly contested issue.
Hence for current purposes, it will suffice to highlight some of the
salient strengths and weaknesses of each approach and to offer a few
points of comparison and contrast. Constitutionalist approaches have
the virtue of clearly delimiting the powers of regimes and their
relationships with one another. The constitutionalist approach thus
promises to bring hierarchy and order, or at least a set of coordinating
mechanisms, into an otherwise chaotic and potentially contradictory
system. Of course, many question whether a highly diverse
constellation of international legal actors shares a comprehensive set
of universal values that can bring order and hierarchy to the disorder
associated with fragmentation.48 Moreover, even if as a descriptive
matter such a set of values existed, the desirability of a
constitutionalist approach would turn, in part, on the normative
attractiveness of the underlying value system.
Broad constitutionalist visions also purport to address concerns
over international law‘s legitimacy and democratic pedigree.
However, some critics suggest that constitutional advocates
appropriate constitutionalism‘s value-laden rhetoric precisely in order
to profit from its connotations of representativeness, transparency,
and legitimacy and to confer dignity and power on the international
order.49
How does the constitutionalist approach compare to global
administrative law? Both approaches explore the uses and limitations
on the exercise of authority in transnational settings. However, unlike
can be important overlaps between approaches. For discussions of constitutional
pluralism, see generally Daniel Halberstam, Local, Global and Plural
Constitutionalism: Europe Meets the World, in EUROPE‘S CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND OTHERS (Gráinne de Búrca & Joseph H.H. Weiler eds., forthcoming); Miguel
Poiares Maduro, Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a Theory of Judicial Adjudication
in the Context of Legal and Constitutional Pluralism, in RULING THE WORLD,
supra note 33, at 356–80; Neil Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, 65
MODERN L. REV. 317 (2002).
48. For a discussion, see Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 33, at 3–36; ANDREW
HURRELL, ON GLOBAL ORDER: POWER, VALUES, AND THE CONSTITUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 10 (2004). See also generally Thomas Cottier,
Multilayered Governance, Pluralism, and Moral Conflict, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 647 (2009); JAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLICITY:
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY (1995) (noting domestic
constitutionalism‘s difficulties in accommodating social and cultural diversity).
49. See generally Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Politics of International Constitutions:
The Curious Case of the World Trade Organization, in RULING THE WORLD, supra
note 33, at 178–205.
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constitutionalism, which tends to be state-centric, GAL takes a
broader view of international law‘s processes and actors. In
particular, GAL properly directs attention to the role of nonstate
actors and of various public-private and private processes of norm
making and norm application. In many other ways, however, the
GAL project is much less ambitious than the constitutionalists‘.50 For
example, while GAL writings focus largely on administrative
exercises of power, constitutionalists also examine legislative and
judicial practices. Moreover, constitutionalism addresses a much
richer array of normative and institutional issues than GAL does.
GAL focuses on specific dimensions of global governance,
specifically the accountability and legitimacy of global administrative
practices. While accountability and legitimacy are central
constitutional values, constitutionalists address a wider range of
normative concerns that are associated with contemporary global
governance. GAL‘s relatively reduced ambit arguably makes it more
practical and achievable in the medium term than the more ambitious
constitutionalist vision.
GAL is less ambitious than constitutionalism in yet another way as
well. GAL largely takes the existing order as is and proposes
incremental changes to existing institutions.51 However, by failing to
engage with larger structural and normative issues, GAL runs the risk
of seeming to legitimate particular narrow practices that are
themselves embedded in a larger system that is itself largely
illegitimate.52 Finally, insofar as GAL focuses on administrative
practices within specific regimes, it has little to say about the issues
raised by fragmentation, which center on the institutional and
normative relationships among regimes. To the extent international
constitutionalization defines the scope and limits of authority within
regimes and allocates authority among regimes, this approach
responds to fragmentation.
Pluralism presents a different set of strengths and weaknesses. Like
GAL, pluralism does not purport to resolve the puzzles arising out of
regime interaction through the introduction of order and hierarchy.
Indeed, many pluralists emphasize that there is no meta-rationality
50. See Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 33, at 33–34; Nico Krisch, Global
Administrative Law and the Constitutional Ambition (London Sch. of Econ.,
Working Paper No. 10/2009).
51. Krisch, supra note 50, at 14.
52. Id. at 18.
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that can be invoked to order a proliferating number of international
institutions and norms.53 However, from a pluralist perspective, it is
not clear whether the resulting (dis)order should be understood as
problematic. Jurisdictional overlap can ―provide important systemic
benefits by fostering dialogue among multiple constituencies,
authorities, levels of government, and nonstate communities.‖54
Relatedly, by keeping the relationships between legal orders
undetermined, global legal pluralism keeps them open to political
redefinition over time. This flexibility can be desirable in a highly
diverse and rapidly changing international society.55 On the other
hand, as Nico Krisch notes, adaptability can be a double-edged
sword. Adapting to benign changes is desirable; but adapting to
harmful developments is less so. Thus this supposed virtue may be
desirable only in limited circumstances.56
Pluralism‘s advocates sometimes claim that their approach opens
up contestatory space in ways that the other approaches do not. 57
Multiple and overlapping legal authorities provide opportunity for
individuals and groups to select from among coexisting institutions to
promote their aims. On the other hand, even accepting that pluralism
in fact opens up multiple sites of contestation, the sheer multiplicity
of legal orders means that political successes in one order do not
necessarily translate into successes elsewhere. So it is not clear that,
as compared with competing approaches, a pluralist structure, in and
of itself, will necessarily produce greater opportunities for political
change.
To be sure, these brief observations only begin to explore some of
the strengths and limits of each approach. While complete discussion
would consume all of this volume and more, an example might help
53. See generally Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, RegimeCollisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law,
25 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 999 (2004). For a contrasting account of why international
tribunals are unable to resolve the jurisprudential and conceptual puzzles associated
with regime interaction, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, A New Approach to Regime
Interaction, in REGIME INTERACTION, supra note 26.
54. Berman, supra note 43, at 238.
55. Nico Krisch, The Case for Pluralism in Postnational Law 21 (London Sch.
of Econ., Working Paper No. 12/2009).
56. Id. at 22.
57. See Berman, supra note 43, at 238. See also generally Krisch, supra note
55; BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW,
SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION (1995).
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concretize some of the differences among these three conceptual
approaches. Consider the debate over United Nations‘ sanctions
against suspected terrorists. As part of the UN‘s response to several
high-profile terrorist acts, the Security Council adopted a series of
resolutions establishing a complex sanctions regime against
individuals and firms suspected of supporting international
terrorism.58 Specifically, in 1999, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1267 requiring all states to impose financial sanctions and
an arms embargo against the Taliban. To monitor the sanctions, the
resolution also created a so-called ―sanctions committee.‖ Later
resolutions, particularly those adopted after the September 11, 2001
attacks, widened the target of sanctions and require UN member
states to impose economic sanctions against any person or entity
included on a ―consolidated list‖ of names maintained by the
sanctions committee. The consolidated list consists of names
forwarded by UN member states, as well as regional and international
organizations, to the sanctions committee. Under the committee‘s ―no
objection‖ process, unless an objection or hold is placed upon a
proposed addition to the list, all states must freeze the assets of the
suspect and ban his travel. Despite the adoption of a series of
procedural reforms over time,59 substantial concerns remain over the
procedural fairness and lack of transparency of the UN sanctions
regime.60
58. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004); S.C. Res.
1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999).
59. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1735, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1735 (Dec. 22, 2006); S.C. Res.
1730, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1730 (Dec. 19, 2006); Secuity Council, Letter dated 8
March 2006 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and
associated individuals and entities addressed to the President of the Security
Council, delivered to Security Council members, U.N. Doc. S/2006/154 (Mar. 10,
2006).
60. See, e.g., THOMAS J. BIERSTEKER & SUE E. ECKERT, WATSON INST. FOR
INT‘L STUD., STRENGTHENING TARGETED SANCTIONS THROUGH FAIR AND CLEAR
PROCEDURES (2006),
http://www.watsoninstitute.org/pub/Strengthening_Targeted_Sanctions.pdf; IAIN
CAMERON, COMM. OF LEGAL ADVISERS ON PUB. INT‘L L., THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, DUE PROCESS AND UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL COUNTER-TERRORISM SANCTIONS (2006), http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_af
fairs/legal_co%2Doperation/public_international_law/Texts_&_Documents/Docs%
202006/I.%20Cameron%20Report%2006.pdf (report commissioned by the Council
of Europe); BARDO FASSBENDER, TARGETED SANCTIONS AND DUE PROCESS 29–30
(2006), http://www.un.org/law/counsel/Fassbender_study.pdf (study commissioned
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The European Community implemented the sanctions regime
through a number of EC regulations. As a matter of EC law, these
regulations have direct legal affect in the domestic legal systems of
all EU member states.61 Moreover, under EC law, community
legislation trumps national law, even domestic constitutional law.
In 2001, the UN sanctions committee added the names of Kadi, a
Saudi Arabian national with significant assets in Europe, and Al
Barakaat, a Swedish entity, to the consolidated list for alleged
associations with Al-Qaeda. As a result, the EC member states
imposed sanctions against them, including a freezing of their assets.
Kadi and Al Barakaat denied any involvement in terrorist activities
and filed petitions in the Court of First Instance (CFI) seeking an
annulment of the relevant Council regulations. Petitioners claimed
that the regulations infringed their fundamental rights, including the
right to property, the rights to be heard before a court of law, and the
right to effective judicial review. In response, the EU Council and
Commission argued that the Community, like member states, was
obliged to give effect to legally binding Security Council resolutions.
At first glance, Kadi might appear to be just another example of
the type of regime interaction that this paper highlights. Indeed,
despite its prominence, it is important to note that Kadi is just one of
a slew of recent cases that involves overlaps and potential conflicts
among various international legal orders.62 Examples within the
European Union legal system include high-profile disputes involving
interactions between EU law and jurisprudence from the European
Court of Human Rights,63 between EU and WTO law,64 and between
by the UN Office of Legal Affairs).
61. Case C-6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585.
62. R (on the application of Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence [2007]
UKHL 58 (2007) (appeal taken from EWCA Civ 327); Behrami v. Fr. & Saramati
v. Fr., F.R.G., and Nor., Nos. 71412/01 & 78116/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 2, 2007);
Hum. Rts. Comm., Views of the Human Rights Committee of 22 Oct. in
Communication No. 1472/2006, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006 (Oct. 22,
2008).
63. See, e.g., Case 36/75, Rutili v. Ministre de l‘intérieur, 1975 E.C.R. 1219;
Case C-84/95, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v. Minister for
Transport, Energy and Communications, 1996 E.C.R. I-3953; Case C-450/06,
Varec SA v. Belgium, 2008 E.C.R. I-581.
64. See, e.g., Case C-122/95, Germany v. Council, 1998 E.C.R. I-973; Case C149/96, Portugal v. Council, 1999 E.C.R. I-8395; Case C-93/02 P, Biret Int‘l SA v.
Council, 2003 E.C.R. I-10497; Case C-377/02, Léon Van Parys NV v. Belgisch
Interventie- en Restitutiebureau, 2005 E.C.R. I-1465; Joined Cases C-120/06 P &
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EU law and the law of the sea.65 But Kadi has attracted substantial
attention because the case raises the dilemmas of regime interaction
in a particularly stark and dramatic manner. The UN Charter provides
that Charter obligations ―shall prevail‖ whenever they conflict with
obligations under any other treaty, and states have agreed that
Security Council decisions in the area of international peace and
security are binding upon all UN member states.66 On the other hand,
governmental seizure of property without notice, a formal hearing, or
meaningful review provisions are in deep tension with the most
elemental notions of due process, not to mention legality itself. Hence
the Kadi case involves a pointed conflict between the world‘s most
important international organization pursuing its mandate of
promoting international peace and security and foundational concepts
of fundamental rights and due process.67
The CFI rejected Kadi‘s petition.68 The court reasoned that the
challenged regulation implemented a UN Security Council resolution
and hence fell outside the ambit of its power of judicial review.
Citing Article 103 of the UN Charter, the court found that member
states‘ obligations under the Charter prevail over potentially
inconsistent obligations arising from other sources of international
law, including EU law. The court stated that the only exception to the
hierarchical superiority of Charter law would be when a UN action
violates an international jus cogens norm; however the court
determined that the measure at issue did not violate a jus cogens
norm.
On appeal, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) reversed and
annulled the challenged regulation. The court found that the EC
regulations at issue were inconsistent with fundamental rights
guaranteed within the European legal order. At several points in its
opinion, the court highlighted the ―internal and autonomous legal

121/06 P, FIAMM and FIAMM Technologies, Giorgio Fedon & Figli Spa and
Fedon America v. Council and Comm‘n, 2008 E.C.R. I-6513.
65. See, e.g., Case C-459/03, Comm‘n v. Ireland (MOx Plant), 2006 E.C.R. I4635; Case C-308/06, Int‘l Ass‘n of Indep. Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Sec‘y of
State for Transp., 2008 E.C.R. I-4057.
66. U.N. Charter arts. 103, 25.
67. Gráinne de Búrca, The European Court of Justice and the International
Legal Order after Kadi, 51 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 1 (2010) [hereinafter, de Búrca, Kadi].
68. See Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and Comm‘n., 2005 E.C.R. II-3649;
Case T-306/01, Yusuf and Al Barakaat, 2005 E.C.R. II-3533.
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order of the Community‖69 and, by implication, the independence of
the EU legal order from the international legal order. The court
similarly took great pains to emphasize that it was reviewing the
legality of the EC regulation and hence that it was not exercising
judicial review over a Security Council resolution.
For current purposes, I am less interested in the details of the
differing rationales found in these opinions than in how the Kadi fact
pattern and the questions it raises about the relationships of different
bodies of international law might be interpreted through the lenses of
international constitutionalism, global administrative law, and global
legal pluralism.
As noted above, constitutionalist approaches often focus on the
systemic unity of the international legal order and on a hierarchical
ordering of legal authority within this system. Hence as de Búrca
notes, the CFI judgment in Kadi can be understood in
constitutionalist terms.70 The court presents a vision of the
international legal order as ―a vertical, integrated one in which the
EU is below the UN, but in which ever lower courts like the CFI are
nonetheless empowered or even required by international law itself to
apply peremptory norms of international law to the organs of the
UN.‖71 Thus the CFI‘s constitutionalist orientation produces a vision
of a single, integrated legal system with strongly hierarchical
elements. In this approach to the international legal order, norms
emanating from the hierarchically superior UN system trump
inconsistent norms found in EU or domestic legal orders.
A global administrative law perspective, in contrast, would not
foreground the complexities of the hierarchical relations among UN
norms, EU law, and national legal orders. Rather, a GAL perspective
would direct attention to the lack of accountability in the processes
that the Security Council uses when deciding whether to add a name
to the sanctions list. Indeed, significant international attention has
focused on whether these procedures are sufficiently transparent and
accountable. For example, at the 2005 World Summit, states called
69. Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and Comm‘n., 2005 E.C.R. II-3649, para.
317.
70. de Búrca, Kadi, supra note 67, at 4.
71. Gráinne de Búrca, The European Court of Justice and the International
Legal Order after Kadi, at 33,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1321313 (earlier version of de
Búrca, Kadi, supra note 67).
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upon the Council to ensure that ―fair and clear‖ procedures be applied
in listing decisions,72 and in 2006 the UN Secretary General argued
that the perceived legitimacy of sanctions would turn on the
procedural fairness of the listing system.73 These and other similar
statements, along with Kadi and similar judgments, have created
significant political pressure for the Security Council to revise its
procedures. But how might it do so in a way consistent with GAL
insights?
Adopting a GAL approach would not necessarily compel any
particular reforms to the sanctioning process; rather, it might suggest
a variety of possible approaches to improve the fairness and
functioning of the system. For example, a GAL perspective would
highlight various ways to ensure that listing decisions are made more
fair and more transparent, such as having the Council provide a
precise definition of the objectives of sanctions and criteria listing,
establishing consistent norms and general standards for the type of
information to be provided in a listing request, and providing
procedures for notification of individuals of the rationale for the
measures being imposed.74 A GAL approach would also highlight the
desirability of providing a formal and independent review mechanism
whereby targets may appeal decisions to impose sanctions against
them to a body empowered to provide appropriate relief. Again, such
a mechanism could take one of several forms, such as an
ombudsman, a panel of experts, an independent arbitral panel, or
some form of judicial review.75
Pluralists would offer yet a third perspective on the issues
presented by Kadi. They would emphasize the multiplicity and the
autonomy of legal orders—precisely the approach taken by the ECJ
and even more clearly by Advocate General Maduro in his opinion.76
Through its repeated emphasis on the autonomy of the European
legal order and by explicitly denying that it was reviewing the
legality of a Security Council resolution, the Court presented a
―horizontal and segregated‖ vision of the international legal order,
72. G.A. Res. 60/1, para. 109, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).
73. See U.N. SCOR 61st Sess., 5474th mtg. at 7–8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5474 (June
22, 2006).
74. See, e.g., BIERSTEKER & ECKERT, supra note 60.
75. See generally id.
76. For a pluralist reading of the Advocate General‘s opinion, see generally
Besson, supra note 41.
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―with the EU existing alongside other constitutional systems as an
independent and separate municipal legal order.‖77 Interestingly, the
ECJ‘s version of pluralism does not view the Kadi fact pattern as
requiring, or even hoping to prompt, inter-systemic dialogue over the
relationship among various international legal regimes.78
IV
Where does this analysis leave us? I began by noting the tension
between the forward-looking conference theme and the backwardlooking functional organization of the conference panels and used
this tension as a springboard to outline three conceptual approaches
to understanding current and future trajectories in international law.
One could surely critique my treatment of international law‘s past
and future as strongly influenced by current disciplinary
preoccupations. I accept that my thumbnail history retrojects current
concerns into the past and suspect that we can hardly help but project
contemporary concerns into the future. That said, I think that
historical inquiry is useful here, as in other areas of intellectual
inquiry. A historical perspective is useful, not because we should
expect the discipline‘s history to provide answers to today‘s
challenges, but because it is the repository of the international
community‘s shared struggles—its victories, its disappointments, and
its common commitments. International law‘s history thus offers
invaluable resources as we debate the most important questions of
political life and as we construct our common future.
Which of the three approaches is most likely to gain ascendency?
In the aftermath of WWII, the French poet and writer Rene Char
wrote: ―Notre heritage n‘est precede daucun testament.‖79 I take this
aphorism to suggest that no testament, no historical tradition,
compels any particular future. International law is not a natural
feature of our physical world, like the sun or the moon. Rather, it is a
social construct. And international legal doctrine is not the product of
abstract ideals but of contingent and often problematic social and
political processes. So, international law‘s future will be one that we
decide collectively; the emerging legal order will be created, not

77. de Búrca, Kadi, supra note 67, at 29.
78. See generally id.
79. HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 3 (1961).
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discovered.80
Precisely because our heritage is left to us by no testament, it is
important to be clear about what is at stake in debates over
international law‘s future. This paper has focused upon the
fragmentation of the international legal order and rule conflicts
among regimes. But the choice among competing visions of the
international legal order is not merely a matter of legal doctrine. Nor
is it simply a question of abstract theorizing, of interest only to
academics. The emerging international legal order concerns nothing
less than the structure—the means and the ends—of global political
life. The international community‘s ability to productively address
any pressing international issue—one billion hungry people, the
spread of nuclear weapons, genocide, world poverty, climate change,
global justice—will be powerfully affected by the structure of this
emerging order. That is why this debate and the topic of this volume
are so very critical.
I recognize that this paper leaves open more questions than it
answers. But for current purposes I have little interest in predicting
outcomes which I think are unpredictable and historically contingent
in any event. Rather, my goals are, first, to provide a tour d’horizon
of contemporary issues in international law and, second, to identify
some of the central debates that will arise as we work through the
perplexities of global governance.

80. See generally David Kennedy, The Mystery of Global Governance, in
RULING THE WORLD?, supra note 33, at 37–68.

